University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

1998

Natural Resources and the Ninth Circuit Split
Carl W. Tobias
University of Richmond, ctobias@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Carl Tobias, Natural Resources and the Ninth Circuit Split, 28 Envtl. L. 411 (1998)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT SPLIT

BY
CARL TOBIAS*

Congress recently considered some proposals to split the Ninth Circuit, proposals that could have far-reaching effects on the environment, public lands,
and natural resources. This Article first looks at some of the recent developments in Congress, particularly the authorization of a national study commission to examine the federal appeals courts. Professor Tobias predicts that
the Ninth Circuit will be split during the next decade. He cautions against
using political considerations to conduct legislative policymaking with respect to thefederal courts. He suggests that those concerned about the environment gather reliable information and explore alternatives to circuit-splitting.
If Congress decides to bifurcate the Circuit, he suggests that it examine how
districts will be realigned, particularly in terms of concepts such as ecosystems, endangered species habitats, wildlife corridors, or river drainages, and
in terms of specific natural resources such as old growth forests, salmon, and
grizzly bears.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Those concerned about the environment, public lands, and natural
resources, as well as about the federal courts in the West and the nation,
closely monitored the debate over a controversial proposal by the 104th
Congress to split the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In the initial session of the 104th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved Senate Bill 956 (Proposal), a proposal which would have created a new 1\velfth Circuit comprised of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, leaving California, Hawaii, Guam, and
the Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit. 1 The Judiciary Committee decision was significant because no proposal for bifurcating the Circuit had ever advanced so far, and the second session of the 104th
Congress might well have divided the Circuit. A split of the Circuit could
have substantially affected the environment, public lands, natural resources, the federal judicial system in the western United States, and the

* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
The Author completed most of his work on this Article while teaching at the University of
Montana School of Law. The Author would like to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this Article, as well as Ann and
Tom Boone and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. This Article is for Al
Stone.
1 S. 956, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
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country. During March 1996, however, the sponsors of Senate Bill 956 decided that they lacked the necessary votes to pass the proposal and agreed
to a compromise which would have authorized a national commission to
study the federal appeals courts. 2 The House of Representatives accorded
this proposal little attention, and the 104th Congress adjourned in October
without passing either the study commission proposal or the circuit-dividing bill.
There are several important reasons why those interested in natural
resources and the federal courts cannot assume that the circuit-splitting
issue is moot. First, bifurcation's proponents introduced legislation that
would have divided the Ninth Circuit relatively soon after the 105th Congress convened. 3 The first session of the 105th Congress did not pass the
proposed legislation. However, it did authorize a study which would emphasize the Ninth Circuit, an analysis that has apparently become a condition precedent to serious consideration of circuit-splitting. 4 Second, the
pressure to split the Ninth Circuit will probably build as the Circuit's
caseload, population, and perhaps membership, continue to increase, as
more new judges join the Circuit who are less committed to maintaining
its current structure, and as Congress persists in authorizing additional
judgeships and splitting circuits as solutions to docket growth.
The remarkable quantity and quality of resources that exist within the
Ninth Circuit also emphasize bifurcation's critical nature. For instance, a
significant number of the country's national parks, such as Glacier, Grand
Canyon, and Yosemite, are located within the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, numerous wilderness areas, including the Frank Church River of No Return
and the Bob Marshall Wilderness Areas, and many wildlife refuges, such as
the Arctic and Malheur National Wildlife Refuges, are within the Circuit's
jurisdiction. Indeed, an astounding seventy percent of the federal public
lands in the entire United States are within the Ninth Circuit's purview. 5
Finally, division today would be inadvisable in the absence of empirical
data clearly demonstrating that the Circuit is experiencing severe difficulties and that circuit-splitting is the best solution.
These ideas mean that the possibility of bifurcating the Ninth Circuit
warrants analysis. This Article undertakes that effort. Part II first evaluates developments relating to the circuit-dividing proposals that Congress
explored during 1995, 1996, and 1997. Finding that the proposals acquired
considerable momentum in the 104th Congress, Part III assesses the prospects for splitting the ·circuit. Because the 105th Congress closely considered the bills sponsored by bifurcation's advocates, this Article calls for
the collection, analysis, and synthesis of sufficiently reliable information
to support fully informed decisionmaking and for the development of fea2 142 CoNG. REc. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murkowski (RAlaska)).
3 S. 431, 105th Cong. § 11 (1997).
4 H.R. 2267, 105th Cong. § 305 (1997).
5 David Schaefer, Northwest Push for New Court Gains Foes, 1 Ally, SEATILE TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1990, at B4.
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sible alternatives to the Ninth Circuit split. These are duties which the
recently authorized commission will ostensibly discharge.
II.

RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 104TH CONGRESS

In May 1995, senators representing Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon,
and Washington introduced legislation which would have bifurcated the
Ninth Circuit. 6 Senator Slade Gorton CR-Wash.) and Senator Conrad Burns
(R-Mont.) led the battle to divide the Circuit, while Senator Orrin Hatch
(R-Utah), Chair of the Judiciary Committee, conducted a hearing on Senate Bill 956 during September of that year.
Proponents enunciated three principal arguments in support of the
proposal, and critics developed a number of responses as well as arguments against splitting the Circuit. First, the advocates claimed that the
Circuit's gargantuan size creates complications. 7 Those problems include
geographic magnitude, travel and related costs, the population base
served, the substantial complement of judges (twenty-eight), the Circuit's
docket and concomitant time for deciding cases, and the costs of operating the Circuit.
Critics of Senate Bill 956 offered several responses to the ideas involving size. They asserted that the Circuit has instituted procedures
which address the difficulties attributable to size. 8 For example, the location of circuit administrative units in Pasadena and Seattle, 9 where appeals can be orally argued, responds to the concern about the distances
that counsel and parties must travel. Opponents also contended that great
size is an advantage. 10 For instance, it offers economies of scale, and size
provides considerable diversity in terms of the complexity and novelty of
appeals and in terms of judges' race, gender, political viewpoints, and geographic origins.
6 See S. 956 (proposing a new Twelfth Circuit comprised of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, and leaving California, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit). For discussions of prior proposals, see generally
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1994) [hereinafter RATIONING JusTICE);
Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing. Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 917 (1990) [hereinafter Redrawing Circuit Boundaries); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished
Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995).
7 141 CoNG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton (RWash.)); 141 CONG. REc. S7505-06 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Conrad Bums
CR-Mont)); see generally Tobias, supra note 6, at 1366-69 (discussing the impacts of geographic size on the Ninth Circuit).

8 The Ninth Circuit Split: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 29-31 (1995) [hereinafter S. 956 Hearings] (testimony of Chief Judge Clif-

ford Wallace, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit).
9
10

Id.
Id.; 0FF1CE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTNE OF THE U.S. CouRTS FOR THE NINTI1 CIRCUIT, PosI-

TION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO s. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZA'I10N AcT m'
1995 AND COMPANION BILL H.R. 2935, 4 (1996) [hereinafter PosmoN PAPER].
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Another major argument of the proposal's sponsors was that the Circuit's case law is inconsistent. 11 They observed that the statistical opportunities for conflicts are substantial because, for example, 3276
combinations of three-judge panels might theoretically be comprised to
address one question. 12 The Ninth Circuit Executive Office and federal
courts experts who have evaluated Circuit decision-making have found
minimal inconsistency. 13 The Circuit has correspondingly implemented
mechanisms to treat possible inconsistency. 14 For instance, staff attorneys
review every case and code the issues for consideration into a computer. 15
The Circuit then assigns to the same three-judge panel those appeals
which raise analogous questions and are ready for resolution at the same
time. 16
·
The third important contention of the proposal's advocates was that
California judges, cases, and perspectives dominate the Pacific Northwest.17 This concept may reflect proponents' dissatisfaction with the
Ninth Circuit's determinations in areas such as environmental law and natural resources. 18 Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.), an original cosponsor
11 See 141 CONG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton (RWash.)) (asserting that judges are unable to keep abreast of legal developments, and that the
Circuit's legal opinions are narrow with little precedential value); see generally Tobias,
supra note 6, at 1369-71 (presenting Sen. Mark Hatfield's (R-Or.) argument that the increased caseload creates greater opportunities for inconsistency).
12 Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 938; see also 141 CoNG. REc. S7504
(daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton CR-Wash.)) (chronicling the Ninth
Circuit's inconsistency).
13 Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large Circuit, in
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND Tf!E F'uTuRE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 55, 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra
note 6, at 938-50.
14 Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 939; see also PosmoN PAPER, supra
note 10, at 5-6 (discussing how size has improved decisionmaking and judicial administration); Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth
Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937, 945 (1980) (discussing the Ninth Circuit's calendaring process).
15 Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 939.
16 Id.
17 See 141 CONG. REc. S7505-06 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Conrad Bums
CR-Mont.)) (stating that California generates the majority of Ninth Circuit cases); 141 CoNG.
REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton CR-Wash.)) (stating that
California provides 55% of the Ninth Circuit case filings, and that the Ninth Circuit is dominated by California judges and judicial philosophies); see generally Tobias, supra note 6, at
1371-73 (quoting statements of Sen. Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), Sen. Conrad Bums CR-Mont.),
and Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Or.)).
18 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997) (reversing Ninth Circuit decision that
held that farmers and irrigation district did not have standing to file a citizen suit under the
Endangered Species Act); Meghrig v. KFC Western, lnc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996) (reversing Ninth
Circuit decision that held citizen suit provision of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
authorized cause of action to recover the cost of prior clean up of toxic waste site that no
longer posed a threat to health or the environment); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen
Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (reversing Ninth Circuit decision that upheld citizen group challenge to Forest Service issuance of a special use permit); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480
U.S. 531 (1987) (reversing Ninth Circuit decision granting a preliminary injunction against a
Department of Interior sale of oil and gas leases).
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of the proposed legislation, claimed that a significant reason for its introduction was an increase in litigation against economic activities, such as
timber and mining, which jeopardizes local economic stability. 19 Senator
Burns subsequently stated that the current Ninth Circuit deprives states
which rely heavily on resource management the opportunity to have
judges who might be more sensitive to local needs decide appeals implicating environmental issues. 20 Other proponents of Senate Bill 956, however, have specifically disclaimed these ideas. The Senate Committee
Report (Report) attending the bill expressly disavowed discontent with
the Circuit's decisions in the natural resources field as a proper basis for
splitting the Circuit, even as the Report recognized that some sponsors
had evinced this concern. 21
Numerous opponents of dividing the Circuit denominated the bifurcation effort as environmental gerrymandering, claiming that Senate Bill 956
proponents were attempting to establish a new Twelfth Circuit which
would be more responsive to the development of natural resources and
suggesting that the preferable way to realize substantive legal change is by
convincing Congress to alter the applicable· laws. 22 Critics have correspondingly challenged the sponsors' basic notion that the Circuit's judges
who sit in California are idiosyncratic and identical. 23 Analysis of the
judges' philosophies and the computerized, random selection of panels undermine efforts to stereotype those Circuit members from California. 24
Opponents of the circuit-split proposal also claimed that the Circuit's record in resolving environment disputes was relatively neutral. 25
Several additional contentions favored circuit-splitting. Advocates of
bifurcation argued that members of a smaller circuit, such as the projected
Twelfth Circuit (which would have thirteen judges) would be more collegial, thus improving efficiency. 26 This idea could be correct, even though
\'i 19 Conrad Burns, Gorton-Burns Bill Would Split the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals;
Burns to Hold Up Judicial Nominations Until Bill is Approved (May 25, 1995) (press release,
on file with author).
20 Neil A Lewis, Partisan Gridlock Blocks Senate Confirmation of Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1995, at A16; see NINTH CmcmT CoURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION AcT OF 1995, S.
REP. No. 104-197, at 26 (1995) (disagreeing with Sen. Conrad Bums' CR-Mont.) view that the
Circuit should be divided in order to accommodate regional interests).
21 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8-9.
22 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 26-27; see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization

Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. 284 (1990) [hereinafter S. 948 Hearings] (testimony of Sen. Pete Wilson CR-Cal.)) (providing earlier accusation of environmental
gerrymandering).
23 S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 284-85 (testimony of Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.));
Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 941; Tobias, supra note 6, at 1372.
24 S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 284-85 (testimony of Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.)).
25 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 27; see infra Part III (specifying the breakdown of Ninth Circuit
opinions that were "pro-environment" and "con-environment").
26 Tobias, supra note 6, at 1385-86; see generally FRANK M. CoFF1N, ON APPEAL: CouRTs,
LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 213-29 (1994) (stressing the importance of collegiality within a
court to quality judicial work and describing how a court can achieve and maintain
collegiality).
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familiarity might also foster deleterious routinization and could even lead
to strong disagreements. Critics of circuit-splitting contended that the proposed, smaller Ninth Circuit would have a significantly less advantageous
ratio of three-judge panels to cases than the new Twelfth Circuit and a
considerably less beneficial ratio than the current Ninth Circuit. 27 Critics
also claimed that the proposed Twelfth Circuit would impose substantial
administrative costs, essentially replicating functions which the existing
Ninth Circuit was already performing effectively. 28 They argued that bifurcating the Circuit would fragment the Circuit's unified construction of federal environmental and natural resources law which it has enforced
consistently in the West and across ecosystems that span the political
boundaries of the two proposed circuits. 29
In autumn 1995, the sponsors of Senate Bill 956 conducted discussions with some Judiciary Committee members and a few senators from
states which the Ninth Circuit's bifurcation would have affected.30 Arizona
apparently assumed significance for Senate Bill 956 champions who considered the Committee vote of Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) important, and
the state's docket, population, and Ninth Circuit judges valuable in securing felicitous division. The advocates had first explored the possibility of
placing Arizona in the Tenth Circuit, but abandoned this prospect because
it violated the tradition of not shuffling states between courts of appeal.
In a December 1995 Senate Judiciary Committee markup session, the
Committee agreed on an amendment which placed Arizona and Nevada in
the proposed Twelfth Circuit, authorized thirteen judges for that Circuit,
and located its headquarters in Phoenix. 31 Committee members, except
for Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala.), approved the amended proposal in an
11-7 vote along party lines. 32 Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) vociferously fought the amendment for several reasons. 33 Most important many
advantages which the new Twelfth Circuit would have attained would
have been at the expense of the proposed Ninth Circuit. For example, the
proposed Ninth Circuit would have had a detrimental ratio of three-judge
panels to cases and would essentially have been a one-state circuit. Sena27 Pos1T10N PAPER, supra note 10, at 3; S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 29-31 (testimony of Chief Judge Clifford Wallace).
'
28 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 24-25; Pos1TI0N PAPER, supra note 10, at 4.
29 S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 30 (testimony of Chief Judge Clifford Wallace);
Pos1T10N PAPER, supra note 10, at 5; see S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 508 (testimony of
Michael Traynor, Chair, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund) (affording earlier expression of
idea); S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 285 (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.))
(same).
30 See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 5-6 (summarizing the hearing on September 13, 1995).
31 S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); Hearings on Markup of S. 956 Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Markup Hearjngs]; Adrianne Flynn, Senate Panel
OKs New Appeals Court; Circuit Would be Based in Phoenix, Amz. REPUBLIC, Dec. 8, 1995,
at Bl.
32 Markup Hearings, supra note 31; S. REP. No. 104-197, at 6; Flynn, supra note 31.
33 Markup Hearings, supra note 31; S. REP. No. 104-197, at 19-20, 29-31 (Sen. Feinsten
(D~Cal.) argued the amendment was a political move that amounted to judicial gerrymandering); Flynn, supra note 31.
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tor Feinstein offered an amendment which would have authorized a national commission to evaluate the structure of the appellate courts; 34
however, the Committee rejected her proposal by one vote. 35
The day before the Committee markup, Governor Pete Wilson (RCal.) wrote Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) to register his vigorous opposition to any bifurcation of the Ninth Circuit until an objective assessment
of the Circuit was concluded. He observed that the division would promote inconsistency along the West Coast in specific areas, such as natural
resources law. 36 Chief Judge Clifford Wallace contacted the one hundred
senators to state why the Circuit Judicial Council and practically all of the
Circuit's active judges wanted the Circuit kept intact and to request that
Congress authorize an evaluation of the appellate system. 37 Ninth Circuit
Judge Charles Wiggins wrote Senator Feinstein to express his strong opposition to Senate Bill 956, to encourage the Senator to fight the proposal
on the floor, and to call for a national study commission. 38
During March 1996, the champions of Senate Bill 956 attempted to
have the Senate consider the bill in the context of federal courts appropriations legislation. 39 Much substantive debate on the proposed division's
merits ensued; however, the bill's advocates concluded that they lacked
the requisite votes to pass it. Proponents, therefore, agreed to a proposal
for creating a national study commission which passed easily with bipartisan support. 40 The proposal was assigned to the House Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, which Representative
Carlos Moorhead (R-Cal.) chaired. The proposal for a national committee
remained in that subcommittee until September, when several senators
threatened to attach the study commission proposal to court appropriations legislation, and this led Representative Moorhead to move the proposal out of his subcommittee. However, Congress adjourned before both
Houses could consider the study commission, although it did appropriate
$500,000 for a study.
In short, individuals and entities interested in the environment, public
lands, and natural resources, as well as the federal courts in the West,
closely tracked legislative developments relating to Senate Bill 956 during
the 104th Congress. The proposal's passage might have substantially affected environmental resources as well as the federal, civil, and criminal
Markup Hearings, supra note 31.
Id.
36 Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file with author).
37 Letter from Chief Judge Clifford Wallace, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
to Sen. Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.) (Dec. 21, 1995) (on file with author); see S. REP. No. 104197, at 6 (suggesting need for a study of the appellate system).
38 S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 107 (testimony of Sen. Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)) (suggesting need for "careful evaluation of the entire circuit court structure"); Letter from Judge
Charles E. Wiggins, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (DCal.) (Dec. 18, 1995) (on file with author).
39 142 CONG. REc. S2219-303 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996); see Carl Tobias, A Proposal to
Study the Federal Appellate System, 167 F.R.D. 275, 279 (1996) (analysis of Senate Bill 956).
40 142 CoNG. REc. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996).
34
35
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justice systems. In the end, Congress did not split the Ninth Circuit or
approve a study commission.

III.

PROSPECTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DIVISION

Members of Congress who favor division of the Ninth Circuit introduced a circuit-splitting proposal again in the 105th Congress. 41 Once
more, the three principal reasons articulated by advocates of bifurcation
were the Circuit's enormous size, inconsistency of the Circuit's case law,
and California's dominance of the Circuit. These justifications were at
least as applicable at the outset of the 105th Congress as they were during
the 104th Congress. 42 Indeed; champions of circuit-splitting contended
that certain aspects of the Circuit's operations had deteriorated since
1995.

Proponents of the split argued that the number of individuals whom
the Circuit serves as well as the size of the Circuit's caseload have continued to grow and will increase in the future, while the Circuit had reduced
only minimally the time which it requires for resolving appeals. 4 3 Opponents of circuit-splitting could have responded by showing that the Circuit
had improved its disposition of appeals in terms of several parameters,
such as the speed with which judges write opinions once the cases are in
their hands. 44 Critics might also have observed that the Circuit could have
significantly expedited appellate dispositions had it been operating with
the full complement of active judges authorized. 45 Indeed, one argument
against the proposed split is that the Circuit could resolve appeals much
more promptly if the nine additional judges whom the Judicial Conference
has requested were authorized and appointed. 46 Of course, if this occurred
41

S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997).

See supra notes 7-25 and accompanying text (articulating reasons given for splitting
the Circuit during the 104th Congress); see generally Tobias, supra note 6, at 1366-73 (dis42

cussing the arguments for bifurcation, including size, inconsistency, and California's
dominance).
43 143 CoNG. REc. S1104 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1997) (statement of Sen. Conrad Bums (RMont.)); see S. REP. No. 104-197, supra note 20, at 9-10 (discussing how the Ninth Circuit's
size has contributed to delay in processing cases); 141 CoNG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25,
1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton CR-Wash.)) (stating that the Ninth Circuit is the fastest
growing circuit, and that caseloads are becoming larger).
44 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 28; POSITION PAPER, supra note 10, at 7; see also S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 32 (testimony of Chief Judge Clifford Wallace) (stating out that the
Ninth Circuit is the second most efficient court in deciding the cases once they are submitted to the judges).
45 See Pos1T10N PAPER, supra note 10, at 7 (arguing that the median time of disposition is
unlikely to improve substantially until the court is staffed with its full complement of
judges); see also S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 32 (testimony of Chief Judge Clifford
Wallace) (same). During much of 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals experienced vacancies in ten of its twenty-eight authorized judgeships. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 1997
YEAR-END REPORT O~' THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1997).
46 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ACTS ON CAMERAS IN COURT
(1996); Tobias, supra note 6, at 1411; see S. REP. No. 104-197, at 6 (pointing out that the issue
to split the Ninth Circuit presents an immediacy not evident with respect to other circuits
because the Ninth Circuit has requested an additional ten judges).
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and the number of authorized judges increased to thirty-seven, circuitsplitting advocates might have made a stronger argument that the large
judicial complement complicates the Circuit's management and, thus,
compels bifurcation.
The other two major contentions advanced by supporters of the Ninth
Circuit split, growing inconsistency in Circuit case law and California's
dominance of the Circuit, seem less persuasive than the arguments relating to size. 47 In fact, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved Senate Bill
956, even though considerable information suggested that intracircuit conflicts were not a serious problem and that California's dominance was not
evident from analysis of the Circuit's environmental opinions. 48 For instance, Professor Arthur Hellman, who has studied the Ninth Circuit more
than any other legal academician, testified that evaluation of the Ninth
Circuit precedent indicated minimal inconsistency. 49 Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) correspondingly
found that an assessment of 129 recent opinions in the environmental area
yielded 64 which were "pro-environment" and 65 which were "con-environment. "50 The Senate Committee Report concomitantly rejected dissatisfaction with the Circuit's decision-making in the natural resources field
as an appropriate reason for bifurcation. 51
Certain factors examined above suggest that pressure to split the
Ninth Circuit will continue increasing. For example, if nine more judges
for the Circuit were authorized and appointed, a contingent of judges
which exceeds by twenty the complement on the next largest circuit (the
Fifth Circuit), the Ninth Circuit's size would afford proponents of bifurcation a strong argument. 52 Thirty-seven judges could exacerbate the administrative problems of a circuit which may already be the most difficult
circuit to manage. Moreover, expanding the Circuit's membership by nine

See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text (discussing these contentions in detail).
S. REP. No. 104-197, at 9-10. But see supra notes 11-25 (discussing the potential for
inconsistency and California's role in the Circuit).
49 S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 107.
50 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 27; see supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (discussing
arguments of proponents of Senate Bill 956 that the Ninth Circuit be more responsive to the
development of natural resources and arguments of opponents that the environmental record is relatively neutral). But see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing the
view that the Pacific Northwest's needs are underrepresented).
51 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 27; see also infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (arguing
that political reasons such as attempting to secure court opinions favorable to the development of natural resources are inappropriate reasons for splitting the Circuit).
52 S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 72 (testimony of Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain); see supra note 46 and accompanying text (pointing out that increasing the
number of judges may complicate the Circuit's management); see also supra note 26 and
accompanying text (presenting the argument of circuit split proponents that a small court is
more collegial). But see supra Part II (suggesting potential problems with familiarity between judges). The Fifth Circuit has seventeen judges.
47

48
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judges may multiply the statistical opportunities for conflicting opinions
which the Circuit's critics already contend are significant. 53
Even if Congress does not authorize additional positions for the Ninth
Circuit, numerous judges will join the Circuit as replacements for members who assume senior status or resign. The future appointees will probably be less concerned about keeping the Circuit intact than the Circuit's
members have historically been. Indeed, prior to the 104th Congress, no
judge of the Ninth Circuit had publicly stated that the division was advisable.54 New appointees, who are not steeped in the Circuit's traditions, may
simply be less committed to maintaining it's century-old structure.
Pressure to bifurcate the Circuit also will continue to build until the
focus shifts to treating caseload increases rather than authorizing additional judgeships and dividing appellate courts. 55 There are numerous
structural and non-structural approaches besides adding judges and dividing circuits which may respond more effectively to mounting dockets. For
example, Congress might restrict civil or criminal jurisdiction, create subject matter courts, or limit the right of appeal. 56
The Senate Committee Report accompanying the proposal that the
Judiciary Committee approved apparently summarized and epitomized the
views that increasing numbers of judges and congressional members will
probably hold regarding the Ninth Circuit. The Report found that the Circuit "stands well apart from the other Federal judicial circuits and remains
in a unique position. . . . [as] by far the largest court of appeals in the
Federal system by any measure. "57 The Report correspondingly asserted
that "no other circuit presents anywhere near as compelling a case for
being split" and that the Circuit's request for ten additional judges gave
circuit-splitting an immediacy which was not evident for any other
circuit. 58
In short, the 104th Congress seriously considered bifurcating the
Ninth Circuit; the 105th Congress devoted some attention to the prospect
and even could have split the Circuit. However, Congress decided instead
to authorize a commission that will study the appellate courts, In any
53 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting that 3,276 combinations of threejudge panels are possible). But cf supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (finding minimal inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit's decisions).
54 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8, 20. Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain suggested in testimony at the
Senate hearing that he considered division appropriate and inevitable, but not imminent. See
S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 69-71 (testimony of Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain) ("I am
convinced that it is inevitable that the [N]inth [C]ircuit be split and that the time for that
split, while not yet iinminent, may well be fast approaching.").
55 Tobias, supra note 6, at 1386-95; see S. REP. No. 104-197, at 18 (arguing that adequate
and timely information is needed to find a better solution).
56 For a thorough analysis of these and numerous other options see RATIONING Jus11cE,
supra note 6, at 106-286. See a/,so infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing the
creation of a court with national subject matter jurisdiction over appeals concerning environmental, public lands, and natural resources law).
57 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 6.
58 Id.; see supra notes 46, 52 and accompanying text (arguing that adding judges may
make it easier to resolve appeals but suggesting that proponents of bifurcation might then
have a stronger argument).
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event, pressure to divide the Ninth Circuit will only grow over the near
term, and Congress probably will bifurcate the Circuit during the next decade. Part IV, therefore, explores potential responses to the possibility of
bifurcation.
IV.

SUGGESTIONS FoR THE F'uTIJRE

Recommendations for the future warrant relatively brief examination
in this. Article because many broad suggestions regarding the appellate
system and the Ninth Circuit have been afforded elsewhere. 59 However,
recommendations relating specifically to the Circuit and natural resources
are rather difficult to formulate without better information on the Circuit
and the entire appellate system. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide
some general and particular ideas.
A. General Suggestions

1. Caseload Growth and the Appellate System
Numerous experts and institutions which have analyzed the appeals
courts believe that the traditional congressional approach of approving additional judgeships and splitting circuits is ineffective and outmoded, especially as a solution to multiplying dockets. 6 ° For instance, dividing the
courts only redistributes, rather than diminishes, caseload, which is the
real problem that the circuits face. 61 Splitting circuits also irrevocably decreases the circuits' federalizing responsibility to harmonize the Constitution and national policy concerns with state and local policies, thereby
reducing their role as national courts. 62
59 See, e.g., RATIONING JusTicE, supra note 6, at 106-286 (discussing past, present, and
future internal and external reforms of the.federal courts of appeals); Tobias, supra note 6,
at 1395-1415 (discussing solutions to the problems of docket growth, time needed to resolve
appeals, and the large number of new judges needed in the Ninth Circuit); supra notes 36-38
and accompanying text (discussing the proposal to evaluate the appellate system).
60 See, e.g., RATIONING JusTicE, supra note 6, at 99-105 (presenting the argument for a
moratorium on dividing the Ninth Circuit); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a
Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 11, 45-49, 55-57 (discussing the
impact of adding more judges and adjusting the Circuit structure); see also CoMM. ON LONG
RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TIIE U. S., LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR TIIE FEDERAL
CoURTS 44-45 (1995) [hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN] (recommending circuit restructuring
only if compelling empirical evidence demonstrates adjudicative or administrative dysfunction in a court so that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and coherent, consistent
circuit law).
61 See, e.g., Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 948 (referring to a detailed
study of the omnibus judgeship statute which found only a one year impact on the appealsper-panel ratio); Alfred T. Goodwin, Splitting the Ninth Circuit - No Answer to Caseload
Growth, OR. ST. B. BuLL., Jan. 1990, at 10-11 (predicting that the number of cases that must
be heard by three-judge panels nationwide would remain the same and continue to grow no
matter how many new circuits are formed); Patrick Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REv. 261, 270 (1980) (seeing an increase in judges
as the last resort and certainly not an option before discarding diversity jurisdiction).
62 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); John M. Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LoY. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980); see also infra note 76 and
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There is an imperfect understanding of the precise effects of mounting appeals and of many other phenomena which affect the modem apP.ellate court system and specific regional circuits. 63 This lack of
comprehension correspondingly complicates efforts to formulate efficacious solutions to those difficulties that the courts are currently experiencing. Indeed, no thorough evaluation of the entire system or even
individual courts has been conducted since the 1973 report of the Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska
Commission Study). 64
The lack of reliable information about the gravest problems confronting the circuits and effective remedies for these problems has numerous important consequences. Most significant, the lack of information
leaves unclear the wisdom of applying various approaches and means that
the implementation of many apparent solutions, including a particular circuit's division, could prove misguided. For example, it would be unfortunate to split the Ninth Circuit today, possibly committing the nation to an
irretrievable course of action, only to learn subsequently that a different
remedy would have been preferable for the Ninth Circuit or the country.
These ideas suggest that it was appropriate for Congress to authorize
a national study commission. 65 The Commission's purpose is to "study the
present division of the United States into the several judicial circuits [and]
the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system, with
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit," for ten months and two months
thereafter, the Commission must report "recommendations for such
changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the
accompanying text (arguing that a circuit not be divided to support regional interests because doing so would be the antithesis of the federalizing function).
63 See RATIONING JusTicE, supra note 6, at 31-51 (discussing the crisis of volume); Carl
Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CoRNELL L. REv.
1264 (1996) (discussing whether increases in appellate filings have transformed the Ninth
Circuit and whether an increase in judgeships will solve the problem); see also Dragich,
supra note 60, at 25-28 (discussing current conditions in the Federal Courts of Appeals).
64 COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES
OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973)
[hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION); see also S. REP. No. 104-197, supra note 20, at 3-4, 16-17
(presenting the view that the fundamental problem of circuit realignment is the lack of data
and that a study commission like the Hruska Commission should be formed); infra note 72
and accompanying text (pointing out that the last study done was by the Hruska Commission in 1973).
65 In mid-November, a House-Senate Conference Committee agreed on a compromise
which authorized a five-member study commission appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to
study the issue for ten months. H.R. 2267, 105th Cong. § 305 (1997). Congress initially had
been considering two study commission proposals. One proposal called for a report to be
completed in two years. S. 248, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 908, 105th Cong. (1997). The other
proposed that a report be returned within one year, or by June 30, 1998. S. 283, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R. 639, 105th Cong. (1997). The House passed House Bill 908 in June, which authorized a report to be completed within eighteen months. 143 CoNG. REc. H3223-25 (daily
ed. June 3, 1997) (statement of Sen. Howard Coble (R-N.C.)) (passed by a voice vote with
two-thirds in favor of the bill). However, in July, the Senate passed an appropriations rider
that would have split the Ninth Circuit. See S. 1022, 105th Cong. § 305 (1997) (passed by a
vote of 55 to 45).
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expeditious and effective disposition of the caseload of the federal Courts
of Appeal, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due
process. "66

2. The Ninth Circuit
Much of the above also applies to the Ninth Circuit. Perhaps most
importantly, the Circuit may not be experiencing difficulties that are sufficiently problematic to require treatment, especially with solutions which
are as radical, potentially ineffective, and irrevocable as circuit-splitting.
Even if it were clear that the Circuit is facing complications which are
troubling enough to warrant remediation with circuit-splitting, bifurcation
may be inadvisable primarily because California's size apparently precludes workable division. 67 For instance, the realignment that Senate Bill
956 proposed would have created a sprawling Twelfth Circuit, dubbed the
"stringbean circuit," and would have left an unprecedented two-state
Ninth Circuit comprised of only California and Hawaii. 68 Unless Congress
authorizes three courts of appeal, the only way in which Congress can
evenly split the Circuit caseload is by bifurcating California and by assigning the state's four federal districts to different appellate courts. 69 This
solution would also be unprecedented and could be problematic70 because the two new circuits might interpret California law differently. 71
In short, there is currently inadequate information on many relevant
phenomena that affect the Ninth Circuit, particularly docket growth. The
1973 Hruska Commission study constituted the last comprehensive analysis of the Circuit. 72 This dearth of reliable material seriously complicates
efforts to evaluate the desirability of changes in the Circuit and the efficacy of proposed remedies, especially ones that are as potentially farreaching as division. These propositions show the need for a thorough
H.R. 2267.
Tobias, supra note 6, at 1409-15.
68 S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); S. REP. No. 104-197, at 7, 29-30 (1995); HRUSKA CoMM1ss10N,
supra note 64, at 237 (discussing disadvantages of Circuit dominated by California). The
appropriations rider that the Senate passed in the 105th Congress would have left California
and Nevada in the Ninth Circuit and would have placed the remaining states and territories
in the proposed Twelfth Circuit. S. 1022, supra note 65.
69 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 5-7; HRUSKA CoMM1ss10N, supra note 64, at 238-39; S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 69-71 (testimony of Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain); see generally Arthur
D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 1188 (1974) (exploring the consequences of dividing California between two circuits and mechanisms for avoiding or resolving conflicts).
70 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 7; Tobias, supra note 6, at 1413. But see HRUSKA CoMM1ss10N,
supra note 64, at 238-39 (asserting that the dividing of judicial districts of California between two circuits raises no insolvable or unmanageable problems); Hellman, supra note
69, at 1281 (admitting that none of the conflicts that are likely to arise in the divided state
situations are unique).
71 HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 64, at 238-39.
72 More recent, but considerably less comprehensive, studies are the LoNG RANGE PLAN,
supra note 60; JUDITH A McKENNA, FEDERAL JumcIAL CENTER, STRuCTIJRAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1993); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STIJDY
CoMM. (1990) (hereinafter FEDERAL CouRTS REPORT].
66
67
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assessment of the Ninth Circuit, the difficulties that it is now confronting
and will experience in the future, and developing solutions to those complications. The study should focus on problems that are attributable to
increasing appeals and solutions to these problems. The analysis of the
Circuit ought to be part of, or be coordinated with, a broader examination
of the appellate system. 73 If bifurcation is indicated, evaluators should attempt to designate the preferable division, while they must remember that
no feasible method for reconfiguring the Ninth Circuit has yet been
devised.

B. Suggestions Relating More Specifically to Natural Resources
1. Political Factors
The desire to secure appellate court rulings which are more favorable
to interests that would develop natural resources is an inappropriate basis
on which to premise circuit-splitting. Indeed, the Senate Committee Report, which accompanied Senate Bill 956 and was ostensibly prepared as
an advocacy document for bifurcating the Circuit, expressly and comprehensively delineated the reasons why the Judiciary Committee considered
this motivation improper.
The Report first observed that "some proponents of a [Ninth Circuit]
division have indicated support for splitting the Circuit based on outcomes
in certain cases or on a perceived liberal bias on the part of California
judges ... [and] [f]requently cited ... environmental cases affecting the
northwest States." 74 The Report next proclaimed that "[t]he committee
does not support a split of the [N]inth [C]ircuit on those bases." 75 The
Report relied upon the testimony of then Chief Judge Wallace at the Senate Bill 956 Committee Hearing who stated that division of a "circuit in
order to accommodate a regional interest is the antithesis of the federalizing function," and the contention of Senators Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-Del.)
and Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) that a "split on such grounds would amount
to insupportable political 'gerrymandering.' "76
The Report further stated:
Although a number of parties have registered their dissatisfaction with certain
environmental and other decisions of the [N]inth [C]ircuit, the committee finds
such dissatisfaction an improper rationale for splitting the [C]ircuit [and] does
73 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (explaining that House Bill 2267 directs the
Commission to study the structure and alignment of the federal circuits in general with
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit).
74 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8; see supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text (discussing the
argument that the Ninth Circuit should be split because of insensitivity to local needs in
deciding environmental issues and the counter-argument that those critical of the Ninth Circuit's decisions should change the substantive laws and not restructure the court).
75 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8, 25-27 (asserting that regionalism and ideology play no part in
the drawing of circuit boundaries).
76 Id., at 8; see supra notes 29, 62 and accompanying text (stressing the importance of a
unified construction of federal environmental and natural resources law within the Ninth
Circuit)
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not support altering circuit boundaries in order to achieve a given ideological
outcome on the merits in any case or to benefit any regional interest. 77

The Committee was also "highly skeptical as a practical matter as to
whether any significant ideological shift in appellate decisions could be
achieved through a circuit split. "78 The Report found that the "philosophical tendencies of a particular judge are far more likely to be aligned with
the President who appointed that judge than the State from which the
judge came" 79 and that the precedent of the former Ninth Circuit would
probably have bound the proposed Twelfth Circuit. 80 The Report concluded by characterizing as "questionable" the "propriety of considering
the judicial philosophies and resulting opinions of particular judges or regions when examining· circuit boundaries. "81
During earlier 1990 hearings on a bill to split the Ninth Circuit, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.) suggested that establishing a new Twelfth Circuit
comprised of the five Pacific Northwest jurisdictions would honor Congress's original intent when drawing appellate boundaries-to create circuits reflecting a regional identity by combining a "small set of contiguous
states that shared a common background. "82 This idea might also support
appellate court reconfiguration whereby current Ninth Circuit districts,
such as Idaho and Montana, and present Tenth Circuit districts, such as
Colorado, Utah and Wyoming, all of which are located in the intermountain West, could become part of the same appellate court.
Several propositions, more compelling than these concepts, also essentially derive from the notion of regionalism. First, basing an appellate
court's creation. in 1998 on the aspiration to implement Congress's century-old intent when delineating circuit boundaries appears outmoded. 83
Indeed, it seems preferable to rely upon the idea of diversity, definable in
terms of geographical, political, environmental or demographic differences, when constituting modern courts of appeal in a culture that relies
on "law as the adhesive force binding a diverse population together." 84
77 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8. The Committee expressed its "hope that the court of appeals
will reach correct decisions on the Jaw" and its view that "litigants are entitled to a full, fair,
and expeditious determination of the merits of their case .... [but] [t]hey are not entitled to
a given result." Id.
78 Id.
79 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8-9. Sen. Jon Kyl CR-Ariz.) stated that "when we look at
predictors of how a judge might rule, it is a far greater predictor as to who appointed that
judge than the region of the country from which the judge comes." Id.
80 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 9; see also Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.
1981) (holding that the new Eleventh Circuit is bound by precedent of the former Fifth
Circuit); see generally Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687 (1981) (discussing the 1980 split of the former Fifth
Circuit and correctly predicting that the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits would be bound by
the precedent of the former Fifth Circuit).
81 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 9.
82 S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 252 (testimony of Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Or.)).
83 Tobias, supra note 6, at 1372.
84 Paul D. Carrington, A Nrm; Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45
DuKE L.J. 929, 940 (1996); see also Dragich, supra note 60, at 35-39 (noting society's expectation and need for uniform laws throughout the country); see generally MARTHA MINow, MAK-
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To the extent that regional factors might have applicability in particular cases, district judges arguably can examine the considerations. 85 In appellate courts, the locales where judges are stationed ought to be
irrelevant. The circuits also have an important federalizing responsibility. 86 In short, local favoritism offends the essence of an appeals court,
and the fragmentation of national law contravenes principles of federalism87 while political factors are rarely satisfactory premises for federal
court policy making as significant as circuit-splitting. 88
2. Environmental Factors

Congress must insure that substantial, valid empirical data conclusively demonstrate that docket growth and other phenomena affecting the
Ninth Circuit are troubling enough to warrant treatment and that division
is the optimal solution before implementing this remedy. Nevertheless, bifurcation may be inevitable because other concerns, particularly political
ones, could influence the ultimate determination. For example, most senators who represent the states of the Pacific Northwest possess rather conservative political views, especially regarding natural resources, and may
continue to favor a split of the Ninth Circuit. 89 Political considerations
should not dictate legislative policymaking with respect to the federal
courts. However, there is a limited sphere, which even Article III of the
Constitution recognizes, where appropriate political factors can operate. 90
ING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw (1990) (discussing
diversity).
85 Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 942.
86 Id.; see supra notes 62, 76 and accompanying text (stressing the circuits' duty to harmonize national and local policy concerns and arguing that splitting the Circuit along regional interests would be the antithesis of this duty).
87 S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 287 (testimony of Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.));
Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 942-43; SuBcoMM. TO STUDY Crncurr S1zE,
ABA APPELLATE P1lACTICE COMM., REPORT 3 (1992); see Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges,
Less Justice: The Case Against Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 79 AB.A J., July 1993,
at 70 (analyzing fragmentation and instability of federalism).
88 See Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law and Venue Reform, 49 U. Cm. L. REv.
976, 997-1000 (1982) (political factors are insufficient because they are short-term, checked
by the Supreme Court, and they already have a role in the appointment process); see also
Tobias, supra note 6, at 1374-75 (discussing the political motivations for and against Ninth
Circuit division in the 1989 Congress); supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (reproducing excerpts from Senate Committee Report suggesting refusal to countenance circuit-splitting premised on political factors).
89 ''War" Rhetoric is Given the Boot, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at Al 7; see supra text
accompanying note 6 (specifying the states represented by senators introducing legislation
for a Ninth Circuit split); supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (describing how senators in the Pacific Northwest were dissatisfied with Ninth Circuit decisions in the area of
environmental and natural resources law); see generally WILLIAM P. PENDLEY, WAR ON THE
WEST: GOVERNMENT TYRANNY ON AMERICA'S GREAT FRONTIER (1995) (presenting a Westerner's
stand against environmental regulation such as the Endangered Species Act).
90 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (predicting that Pacific Northwest senators
will continue to favor a Ninth Circuit split because of political considerations); see also S.
REP. No. 104-197, at 8, 30 (recognizing independent responsibilities of Senate Judiciary Committee and Congress to oversee courts of appeal and to address difficulties identified).
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Persons and entities that are concerned about natural resources, the
federal judicial system in the western United States, and the country must
think realistically and creatively about potential approaches. These individuals and organizations should develop a broad range of feasible options
which would make sense in terms of the West's natural resources, while
honoring important values relating to the federal courts, such as expeditious, inexpensive, and fair resolution of appeals. Concerned people and
groups may want to anticipate renewed calls for circuit-splitting by formulating viable alternatives to that possibility.
Illustrative is the creation of a court with national subject matter jurisdiction which would hear all appeals that involve the environment, public lands, and natural resources. 91 The District of Columbia Circuit
effectively functions as such a tribunal when environmental, public lands,
and natural resources statutes require or permit appeals to that court. 92
The Federal Circuit is also a helpful, general analogue. 93 Scholars have
specifically explored the ideas of science and environmental courts, which
would offer certain benefits, namely specialized expertise in the substantive areas being reviewed. 94 Nonetheless, this type of tribunal may entail
91 For general analyses of subject matter courts see RATIONING JusTICE, supra note 6, at
261-69; Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 745 (1981); Daniel
J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471 (1983).
92 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(l) (1994) ("A petition for review of action
of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality
standard, any emission standard or requirement under section 7412 of this title, any standard
of performance or requirement under section 7411 of this title, any standard under section
7521 of this title (other than a standard required to be prescribed under section 752l(b)(l) of
this title), any determination under section 752l(b)(5) of this title, any control or prohibition
under section 7545 of this title, any standard under section 7571 of this title, any rule issued
under section 7413, 7419, or under section 7420 of this title, or any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter
may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia");
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(a) (1994) ("Review of any regulation promulgated under this chapter may be had
upon application by any interested person only in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
States for the District of Columbia."); see generally Sunstein, supra note 88 (discussing D.C.
Circuit and "sagebrush venue").
93 See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 41 (1994)) (creating the federal circuit); see generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989) (discussing
the Federal Court of Appeals' patent jurisdiction); United States Court of Appea/,s for the
Federal Circuit Tenth Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559, 559-1074
(1992) (discussing various specific subject matters in the Federal Court of Appeals, including patent law, Indian claims, veteran claims, trademark, trade, and government contract
decisions).
94 FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 233-35 (Erica Dolgin et al. eds., 1974); see, e.g., James L.
Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law, 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 50001, 50011-12 (1973) (discussing and advising against a special environmental court); Scott C. Whitney, The Case For
Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARYL. REv. 473 (1972) (discussing the creation of a special environmental court); G.J. Zimmerman, Synergy and the
Science Court, 38 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REv. 170 (1980) (discussing the structure, implications,
problems, and limits of a Science Court with particular regard to Canada).

428

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 28:411

some disadvantages, primarily the potential for developing tunnel vision
and for being captured by various constituencies, like regulated interests
or specialized practitioners. 95 Moreover, the federal judicial system has
never formally employed subject matter courts in the natural resources
field, partly because Congress and the judiciary have apparently preferred
general courts. 96
If Congress restructures or bifurcates the Ninth Circuit, those concerned about the treatment of natural resources and the federal courts
may want to consider how the districts that are currently part of the Ninth
Circuit should be realigned, particularly in terms of concepts such as ecosystems, endangered species habitat, wildlife corridors, and river drainages, or in terms of specific natural resources, such as old growth forests,
salmon, or grizzly bears.
Concerned persons and entities could also examine realignment in
terms of the distribution of natural resources or perceived viewpoints of
judges in specific districts. Elevating these considerations over additional
important substantive factors, such as economic growth, or significant
procedural values, including federal court access, may be shortsighted or
counterproductive. 97 Concerned individuals and organizations might also
think about the possibility of combining certain districts in the present
Ninth Circuit with districts in other appellate courts. For instance, the resources and political perspectives in a few Ninth Circuit districts, namely
Idaho and Montana, may resemble more closely those of several Tenth
Circuit districts, such as Colorado and Wyoming. 98 This approach could
create appeals courts that have larger quantities of similar resources or
more compatible viewpoints. This approach, however, may sacrifice diver95 See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L.
REv. 329, 335-36 (1991) (discussing disadvantages in the context of the Commerce Court and
the Tax Court); Meador, supra note 91, at 482-84 (discussing disadvantages such as boredom and lack of intellectual challenge); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism,
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CoRNELL
L. REV. 273, 320 (1996) (discussing boredom, tunnel vision, and loss of prestige).
96 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 60, at 43; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 95, at 319-20;
see also supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing legislation that requires or permits appeals of natural resources cases to D.C. Circuit). Of course, subject matter panels
could be constituted within existing circuits. See FEDERAL CouRTS REPORT, supra note 72, at
120-21 (discussing national subject matter courts); RATIONING JusTicE, supra note 6, at 26169 (same); see also Meador, supra note 91, at 477 (reporting that oil and gas appeals are
assigned to a special panel of several judges in the Fifth Circuit who have developed expertise in the area).
97 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (stressing that political factors should
not dictate legislative policy making with respect to the federal judiciary); see also supra
note 84 and accompanying text (discussing diversity).
98 For example, these states have similar landscapes, climates, and wildlife. They are
also large, sparsely populated areas. Moreover, there is a large percentage of federallyowned land in these states. The political views of numerous senators from these states, such
as Alaska's Ted Stevens (R), Idaho's Larry Craig (R), and Montana's Conrad Burns (R), are
conservative, typically embracing the growth of local economies and control over private
lands, rather than environmental preservation and conservation. See generally PENDLEY,
supra note 89 (presenting the ideology of senators from the West).
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sity of resources and perspectives. 99 For example, circuit-splitting proponents encountered strong resistance when they broached the prospect of
moving Arizona to the Tenth Circuit during the 104th Congress. 100

v.

CONCLUSION

Those concerned about the environment, public lands, and natural
resources as well as federal courts in the West and the nation should carefully monitor the work of the national study commission that the first session of the 105th Congress authorized. Those concerned must think
imaginatively and pragmatically about the proposed bifurcation of the
Ninth Circuit. Feasible alternatives to the Circuit's division are needed.
The 104th Congress seriously considered the proposals that the 105th Congress evaluated and the Commission will now analyze. Systematic, creative anticipation would help to protect the enormous, exquisite natural
resources of the West and honor values that are important to the federal
judicial system.

99 For a discussion of diversity, see .supra note 84 and accompanying text and Oakes,
supra note 94.
100 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing Senate Bill 956).

